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Fliegel: Torts

TORTS

NEWTON v. NATIONAL BROADCASTING
CO., INC.: EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL
MALICE, THE EDITORIAL PROCESS
AND THE MAFIA IN PUBLIC
FIGURE DEFAMTION LAW

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc./ the Ninth
Circuit held that in public figure defamation actions,2 appellate courts must independently review 3 evidence of actual
1. Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1990)
(per Norris, J.; the other panel members were Goodwin, C.J. and Nelson, J.), withdrawn, am'd and reh'g en banc denied, 930 F.2d 662 (1991), cert. denied, _ U.S. _
(1991).
2. A public figure is defined as: (1) those "deemed a public figure for all purposes,"
(2) those "who thrust themselves into the forefront of a particular controversy" and
hence become public figures in relation to that issue, and (3) those who become public figures "through no purposeful action of[their] own." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). This characterization is important because public figure
plaintiffs must satisfy a more demanding evidentiary standard under the first amendment. For further discussion of the public figure doctrine see infra notes 38-43 and
accompanying text.
3. Generally, appellate courts review all purely factual findings for clear error.
See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364~ 394-95 (1948). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. at 395. The Supreme Court has ruled, however, that some
circumstances require a more discriminating deference. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S.
380, 385-86 (1927) (less deference warranted where "conclusion oflaw as to a Federal
right and a finding of fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary in order to pass
upon the Federal question, to analyze the facts"). The exercise of heightened appellate review has become known as the doctrine of independent review. See generally
Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of Defamation: Putting the Horse Behind the
Cart, 35 A.M. U.L. REV. 3 (1985). For further discussion of the doctrine of independent
review see infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
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malice 4 associated with a journalist's investigative or editorial techniques. 6 The court reasoned that subjecting the editorial
process to judicial scrutiny imperils free speech, and explained
that "the media should not fear that its journalists' professional
judgment will be second-guessed by juries without the benefit
of careful appellate review."8
Under Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc.,7 evidence of actual malice turning on the factfinder's
assessment of a speaker's credibility at trial must be reviewed
for clear error. S Newton exempts evidence of actual malice
associated with ajournalist's investigative techniques from the
Bose mandate. 9 By excluding a particular category of evidence
from the range of the Bose decision, the practical effect of
Newton is thus to narrow the scope of the Bose Court's holding. 1o
II.

FACTS

On October 6, 1980, Carson Wayne Newton (Newton) was
the subject of a three· and one-half minute feature on the NBC
Nightly News entitled "Wayne Newton and the Law."ll The
broadcast reported that Newton was attempting to purchase
4. "Actual malice" is a term used to describe the culpable state of mind required
in cases governed by the constitutional rules of defamation. New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The standard is satisfied by publication of a
defamatory falsehood with "knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." [d. at 280. For further discussion of the actual malice standard Bee infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
5. Newton, 930 F.2d at 683. In Newton, the Ninth Circuit treated a decision by
the NBC journalists who researched the broadcast to disregard information furnished during a pre-broadcast interview with Mark Moreno, Newton's acquaintance
and business associate, as conduct constituting an "investigative technique." See id.
6. [d. For a discussion of the remedial function served by appellate courts Bee infra
notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
7. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
8. See id. at 499-500; Bee alBo Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 491
U.S. 657, 688 (1989).
9. Newton, 930 F.2d at 683.
10. See id.
11. Newton v. National Broadcasting Co. Inc., 930 F.2d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 1991).
Excerpts from a portion of the broadcast read as follows:
[Guido] Penosi is a New York hoodlum from the Gambino
Mafia family, a man with a long criminal record ... Penosi
is also a key figure in a federal grand jury investigation ...
that involves one of the big casinos ... [in Las Vegas], the
Aladdin; and one of Las Vegas's top performers, singer
Wayne Newton .... A federal grand jury is now investigating
the role of Guido Penosi and the mob in Newton's deal for the
Aladdin .... Investigators say that last year, just before
Newton announced he would buy the Aladdin, Newton called
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the Aladdin Hotel in Las Vegas, and that he had contacted
Guido Penosi, characterized by NBC as a New York Crime figure, for help completing the deal. I2 The broadcast reported further that Penosi contacted Frank Piccolo (another "mob boss")13
regarding Newton's request, and that in exchange for helping
Newton, Piccolo received a hidden interest in the Aladdin. l •
NBC also reported that the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation
(FBI) was investigating the role of Penosi and the mob in
Newton's acquisition of the Aladdin,16 and strongly suggested that
Newton had given false testimony before Nevada Gaming Board
authorities. 16 NBC aired two follow-up stories after the initial
broadcast. 17
On April 10, 1981, Newton flled a defamation action against
NBC and three of its journalists. 16 Newton claimed that NBC
"either falsely stated or conveyed the false impression that
'Mafia and mob sources' helped [him] buy the Aladdin" and that
while under oath he had deceived Nevada gaming authorities
about his relationship with the Mafia. 19 NBC moved for summary jUdgment, but the motion was denied. 20 The district
court reasoned that although NBC "had 'made a substantial
and persuasive showing that each of the statements made
[were] either true or protected under the common law privilege of fair reporting,' the jury could find that the NBC
Guido Penosi for help with a problem. Investigators say
whatever the problem was, it was important enough for Penosi
to take it up with leaders of the Gambino family in New York.
Police in New York say that this mob boss, Frank Piccolo, told
associates that he had taken care of Newton's problems and
had become a hidden partner in the Aladdin hotel deal.
Id. (citing the district court's record at 43-47).
12. Id. Apparently, in early 1980 Newton and his daughter received death
threats from members of the Genovese family. Id. at 673. Newton testified at trial that
he contacted Penosi for help resolving this conflict. Id.
13.Id.
14.Id.
15. Id. at 666-67. Though Newton was involved, the focus of the investigation was
on the flow of East Coast mob money into the entertainment industry in Las Vegas
and Hollywood. Id.
16.Id.
17. Id. at 667. There were "two subsequent broadcasts concerning the grand jury
investigation" ofPenosi's role in Newton's purchase of the Aladdin and Newton's indictment.ld.
18. Id. Newton sued the reporter, the field producer, and the executive producer.
Id.
19. Id. Although Newton raised this argument on appeal, the court declined to
consider whether liability could be imposed for defamation based on false impressions,
as opposed to false statements. Id. at 668 n.5.
20. Id. at 667.
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broadcasts left a false and defamatory impression about
Newton."21 NBC's motion for a change of venue was also denied. 22
Trial was held in a Las Vegas federal district court, where,
following a 37-day trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding against all four defendants 23 and awarding ~ewton more
than $19 million in compensatory and punitive damages. 24
The $5 million punitive damage award was the largest in
American libel history.26
NBC subsequently moved the court for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new tria1. 26
NBC's motion was denied, but the court did set aside both
Newton's $5 million dollar award for damages to his reputation 27 and his $9 million dollar award for lost past and future
income.28 Additionally, Newton was ordered to file a remittitur.29
He filed the remittitur, and both parties appealed. 30
III.

BACKGROUND

Prior to 1964, defamatory speech 31 was not protected by
the Constitution. 32 Since 1964, however, the Supreme Court
21. [d.
22. [d.
23. [d. 'l'he jury found "that at least one statement and one impression about
Newton conveyed by one or more of the three broadcasts was defamatory, of a factual
nature, and was false." [d. The jury found further that "two of the three NBC journalists
had made a false and defamatory statement with knowledge offalsity or with serious subjective doubts about the statement's truth or accuracy and that all three individual defen·
dants intended to convey a false or defamatory impression about Newton with knowledge
of falsity or serious subjective doubt about the truth of the impression." [d.
24. [d. Additionally, Newton received approximately $3.5 million in prejudgment
interest. [d.
25. [d. at 666.
26. [d. at 667·68.
27. [d. at 668. The district court concluded the award "shocked the conscience." [d.
28. [d. With respect to Newton's claim for lost income, the district court reasoned
the broadcast had not "tarnished" his reputation. [d.
29. [d. Newton was ordered to file a remittitur "of all sums except $225,000 for
physical and mental injury, $50,000 as presumed damages to reputation, and $5
million in punitive damages." [d.
30. [d. In his cross appeal, Newton asked the court to reinstate the $9 million
award for lost past and future income. [d. at 688 n.4.
31. "A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of anoth·
er as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from asso·
ciating or dealing with him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559; see also W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS, § 111, at 774 (5th ed. 1984);
FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAw OF TORTS (2nd ed. 1986) § 5.1 (1). While the idea of
disgrace is necessarily involved, communications "likely to arouse only sympathy or pity
in decent people" may also be defamatory. Prosser & Keeton, supra, at 773.
32. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255·56 (1952).
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has recognized a qualified constitutional privilege to defame
public officials. 33 The privilege, based on the First
Amendment,34 now also extends to cases involving public fig36
ure plaintiffs as well. Although the precise boundaries of
the privilege have not yet been defined,36 developments since
1964 have had a profound effect on both substantive and procedural aspects of defamation law. 37
A.

ACTIONS ARISING UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Characterization of the parties to a defamation action dictates whether the case is governed by the First Amendment. 38
Cases involving "public figure" plaintiffs are subject to constitutional restraints,39 as are actions involving "public.
33. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280-81; McKinnon v. Smith, 275 N.Y.2d 900,903
(1966). The privilege is qualified because it can be overcome by a showing, with clear
and convincing evidence, that the defendant published a defamatory falsehood with
actual malice. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 281.
The privilege has its origins in New York Times where Sullivan, one of three elected commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama, sued the Times after an
advertisement criticizing local police was featured in the paper's March 29, 1960, edition. [d. at 256. Fixing clear and convincing evidence of actual malice as a prerequisite to recovery in public official defamation actions, the Supreme Court held that
Sullivan's failure to prove the advertisement had been published with "knowledge that
[the advertisement's allegations] were false or with reckless disregard of whether [they
were] false or not" precluded his recovery. [d. at 279-80.
34. The first amendment provides, inter alia, that "Congress shall make no laws
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. One
commentator suggests that although the Supreme Court has reviewed first amendment problems extensively, "no meaningful distinction between the freedoms of
speech and press" has been drawn, the Court "frequently comming[ing] both in the term
'freedom of expression. '" Genevra K. Loveland, Comment, Newsgathering: Second-Class
Right Among First Class Freedoms, 53 TEX. L. REV. 1440, 1441 (1975). This commentator also presents a compelling argument for treating freedom of press as a broader right than freedom of speech, reasoning that "while freedom of speech protects the
individual's right to express opinions and beliefs, freedom of the press necessarily
embraces as well society's interest in the unfettered dissemination of information on
matters of public concern to the electorate." See id. at 1441-42 (emphasis added).
35. See infra notes 38-43 discussing the public figure doctrine.
36. See, e.g., United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 404 F.2d 706 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969); see also Prosser & Keeton,
supra note 31, at 805; W. Page Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEX.
L. REV. 1221, 1228 (1976).
37. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 31, at 805; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS (Special Note on the Impact of the First Amendment of the Constitution on the
Law of Defamation).
38. Randall P. Bezanson, Fault, Falsity and Reputation in Public Defamation Law:
An Essay on Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union, 8 HAM LINE L. REV. 105, 105 nA
(1985); Prosser & Keeton, supra note 31, at 805.
39. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v.
Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342; see also Prosser & Keeton, supra
note 31, at 806. For a definition of the public figure designation see supra note 2. At
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officials,"'O providing the allegedly defamatory communication relates to the plaintiff's official conduct.'· While judges
determine whether the plaintiff is a public figure or a public
official as a matter offederallaw,'2 the defendant "probably" has
the burden to prove the action implicates the First
Amendment. 43
B.

COMPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE

1.

Actual Malice

In cases arising under the First Amendment, the constitutional privilege may only be defeated by proof the defendant
published" a defamatory statement with actual malice. 46 At common law, proof of actual malice was not required.'6 In fact,
one time the Supreme Court recognized involvement in an event of public interest as
conduct potentially giving rise to public figure status. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971) (plurality opinion). This interpretation, however, has been
expressly rejected. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-46. For a succinct discussion of the public figure test as applied to corporations see Gary A. Paranzino, Note, The Future of
Libel Law and Independent Appellate Review: Making Sense of Bose Corp v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 71 CORNELL L. REV. 477, 485 n. 50 (1986).
40. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342.
41. See generally Tucker v. Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d 112, 112 (1964), reh'g denied
(1965); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 273 (1971); Goldwater v. Ginzburg,
261 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Zurita v. Virgin Islands Daily News, 578 F. Supp.
306 (1984); Burgess v. Reformer Pub. Co., 146 Vt. 612 (1986). The scope of the public official designation has not been expressly defined. See generally Klahr v. Winterble,
4 Ariz. App. 158 (1966); Fignole v. Curtis Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 595 (D.C. N.Y.
1965). At a minimum, though, the designation appears to apply to government
employees who have substantial control over governmental affairs. See Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Prosser & Keeton, supra note 31, at 806.
42. Harper, supra note 31 § 5.29; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A cmt.
c; Prosser & Keeton, supra note 31, at 806.
43. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 31, at 806.
44. The element of publication does not require that the defamatory statement
be "printed or written." Id. at 797. Rather, publication requires communication of the
allegedly defamatory statement by the defendant to "some one other than the person
defamed." Id.
45. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342; Harte-Hanks, 491
U.S. 667; Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1970); see also Bose, 466 U.S. at 512.
46. James L. Oakes, Proof ofActual Malice in Defamation Actions: An Unsolved
Dilemma, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 655, 698 (1979). In tracing the historical antecedents of
the New York Times actual malice test, Judge Oakes observes that plaintiffs were
essentially required to allege malice on the part of the defendant as an element of the
common law cause of action for defamation. Id. However, plaintiffs were not required
to prove malice.Id. Rather, "the law allowed the jury to conclusively presume malice
from the speaking or writing of defamatory words." Id. Judge Oakes suggests that the
Sullivan Court used the term "actual malice" to distinguish malice in the sense of a
culpable state of mind of a speaker when publishing a defamatory falsehood from this
implied malice existing at common law. Id.
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prior to 1964, liability could be imposed without regard to
whether the defendant was at fault.'?
"Malice" has traditionally been associated with ill-will,
hatred and spitefulness. 48 Within the context of defamation litigation, however, the concept of actual malice bears only a
slight resemblance to its historical predecessor. 49 Indeed, under
existing rules, evidence of ill-will or spite will not suffice. 5O
Rather, proof the defendant published a defamatory falsehood
with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard for the
truth is required. 61 The standard is deliberately subjective. 62

2.

Plaintiff's Evidentiary Burden

At common law, recovery against the intentional publisher of defamatory material was permitted on a theory of strict
liability in tort. 63 In contrast, today, in cases governed by
New York Times, actual malice must be demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence. &4 The heightened burden of
47. See infra note 53 and accompanying text describing plaintift's evidentiary burden at common law.
48. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(Supreme Court's definition of·actual malice" distorts common English); Mahoney v.
Adirondack Publishing Co., 71 N.Y.2d 31, 36 n.1 (1987) (term malice ·commonly understood to mean hostility or ill will toward another person").
49. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 666 n.7 ("the phrase 'actual malice' is unfortunately
confusing in that it has nothing to do with bad motive or ill will) (emphasis added);
see also Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 52 n.18; Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264, 280-81 (1974).
50. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 666; Cf. Erica F. Plave, Tavoulareas v. Piro: An
Extensive Exercise of Independent Judgment, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 854,871 (1988)
("under some circumstances, evidence of ill will or bad motives, when combined with
more weighty evidence of defendant's bad faith, may be probative of a willingness to
publish falsehoods").
51. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80; Bose, 466 U.S. at 511 n.30; Harte-Hanks,
491 U.S. at 667. The concept ofreckless disregard is not easily defined. St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968). However, publication with a "high degree of
awareness of probable falsity" or serious doubt as to the publication's truth will suffice. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.
52. Bose, 466 U.S. at 511 n.30; Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 930
F.2d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 1991); see also New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80; HarteHanks, 491 U.S. 667; St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.
53. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 31, at 804; see also Keeton, supra note 36, at
1222 ("the liability structure could be characterized as no-fault in the sense that, if
the matter published proved to be false, the defendant nonetheless incurred liability no matter how reasonable his belief in the truth of the matter asserted"); Harper,
supra note 31, § 5.0 n.1.
54. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342; Bose, 466 U.S.
at 511; Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A
cmt. f. While originally the Supreme Court referred to a standard of ·convincing
clarity," subsequent decisions reveal that ·clear and convincing evidence" is analogous
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proofi6 is imposed to reduce the risk first amendment values
will be invaded. 68

3.

The Doctrine of Independent Review

Appellate courts generally review purely factual findings
for clear error. 67 But, with the exception of credibility
to evidence demonstrated by "convincing clarity." See, e.g., Bose, 466 U.S. at 511.
Notably, one commentator suggests the standard can be represented quantitatively
by a figure of 75%, as compared to beyond a reasonable doubt at 95% and prepon·
derance of the evidence at 51%. Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 97,104 n.28 (1984).
While clear and convincing evidence of actual malice is required under the first
amendment, this is not the case where actions between "private individuals" are
involved. See generally Gertz, 418 U.S.323. The Supreme Court has declared that "so
long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves
the appropriate standard ofliability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory false
hoods injurious to a private individual."Id. at 347. Accordingly, as between private
individuals, the defendant's conduct may be measured against an objective negligence
standard. See id.
55. "[T]he 'clear and convincing' standard of proof is a higher standard which
reflects a societal judgment about the greater importance of particular types of adju·
dication." Newton, 930 F.2d at 699·70 n.9 (citing Cruzan v. Missouri, 58 U.S.L.W. 4916,
4921 (1990».
56. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285·86; see also Scott M. Matheson, Jr.,
Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact on the First Amendment,
66 TEx. L. REV. 215, 240·41 (1987); Paranzino, supra note 39, at 481.
In Rosenbloom, Justice Brennan articulated the Court's rationale for imposing
the heightened burden of proof. There, he explained that:
In the normal civil suit where [the preponderance of the
evidence] standard is employed, "we view it as no more serio
ous in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the
defendant's favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict
in the plaintiffs favor." In libel cases, however, we view an
erroneous verdict for the plaintiff as most serious. Not only
does it mulct the defendant for an innocent misstatement
. . . but the possibility of such error, even beyond the
vagueness of the negligence standard itself, would create a
strong impetus toward self·censorship, which the First
Amendment cannot tolerate.
Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 50 (quoted in David W. Robertson, Defamation and the
First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REV. 199,247·
48 (1976».
57. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings offact ... shall not be set aside unless clear·
ly erroneous"); see also Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 394-95. The scope of appellate review under
the clearly erroneous standard is narrow because findings are presumed to be correct.
J. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 13.4, at 601.
Purely factual findings usually include inquiries into a defendant's state of
mind. Pullman Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 (1982); Newton, 930 F.2d at 670
n. 12; see also Levine, supra note 3, at 6·7 ("this kind of fact bound inquiry has traditionally been the province of the jury"). The Supreme Court, however, has not
treated evidence of actual malice· arguably involving "no more than findings about
the mens rea of an author; Bose, 466 U.S. at 515 (Rehnquist and O'Connor, J.J., dis·
senting)· as a question of pure fact. See id., at 514. Rather, actual malice appears to
have been characterized as a mixed law·fact question. See id. at 501. Reconciling Bose

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss1/18

8

Fliegel: Torts

1992]

TORTS

243

determinations/s in public figure defamation actions, evidence of actual malice is reviewed de novo. 69 De novo, or "independent review," is justified on grounds that the First
Amendment obligates courts to measure evidence of actual
malice against the governing constitutional principles. 60 The
doctrine applies regardless of whether the action is brought
in state or federal court61 and whether the factfinder IS a
judge or a jury.62
and Swint is difficult, and the Bose decision has been expressly criticized in this respect.
See Paranzino, supra note 39, at 489-93 ("the Court's inability to explain the different treatment accorded similar questions in Swint and Bose may result in a perception of independent appellate review as a tool of judicial favoritism"). Unfortunately,
the Ninth Circuit, while observing that its independent review of the evidence of actual malice had "a peculiar twist," offered no insight into this discrepancy. Newton, 930
F.2d at 670.
58. See infra note 64 and accompanying text discussing the standard credibility determinations are properly reviewed under.
59. De novo review was originally mandated in New York Times where the
Supreme Court declared appellate courts "must make an independent examination of
the whole record ... to assure ... that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden
intrusion on the field of free expression." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285 (citations
omitted). For an extensive list of contemporary circuit court decisions exercising
independent review see Paranzino, supra note 39, at 483 n. 39.
The Supreme Court first exercised independent review in the context of first
amendment cases in Fiske, 274 U.S. at 385-86, where the Supreme Court independently
reviewed a factual determination by a Kansas court that the defendant was guilty of
violating a Kansas Criminal Syndicalism Act. Id. Reviewing the evidence independently, the Court reversed the conviction.ld. at 387. At trial, the defendant had testified that "he did not believe in criminal syndicalism." Id. at 383. The jury found this
testimony incredible.ld. at 385. Rejecting the jury's findings, the Court concluded that
insufficient evidence existed to sustain the verdict. Id. at 386.
The Court has also exercised independent review in cases involving a variety of
first amendment concerns. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (assessing whether defendant's remarks "were so inherently inflammatory" as to constitute
"fighting words"); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-109 (1973) (per curiam) (determining whether defendant was guilty of incitement to riot); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 12,37 (1973) (evaluating whether defendant was in possession of obscene materials); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 159-61 (1974) (measuring motion picture
against obscenity standards).
60. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285 ("this Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional principles; we must also in proper cases review the evidence to make certain that those principles have been constitutionally applied"); see
also Bose, 466 U.S. at 501- 502.
61. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 499. The doctrine originated in New York Times, an
action reaching the Supreme Court on certiorari from the Alabama Supreme Court.
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285. It was first extended to the federal court system in
Bose, a diversity action brought in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts. Bose, 466 U.S. at 488. The Bose Court reasoned the concept of federalism dictated extension of the doctrine to the federal courts.ld. at 499 ("surely it would
pervert the concept of federalism for this Court to lay claim to a broader power of review
over state-court judgments than it exercises in reviewing the judgments of intermediate federal courts").
62. Newton, 930 F.2d at 670 n.11 (citing Bose, 466 U.S. at 501).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 18

244

4.

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:235

The Credibility Exception

As previously discussed, evidence of actual malice is generally subject to independent review in actions governed by New
York Times. 63 Evidence of actual malice turning on the factfinder's assessment of a speaker's credibility at trial, however, is
not reviewed de novo. Rather, under Bose and Harte-Hanks,
appellate courts are required to accord heightened deference to the factfinder's credibility determinations," and credibility determinations are thus properly reviewed under the
63. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
64. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 500 (special deference must be given to credibility deter·
minations); Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688 ("credibility determinations are reviewed under
the clearly erroneous standard ... -); see also Newton, 930 F.2d at 670-71 (special deference is required when reviewing the jury's credibility determinations); Newsom v.
Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 377-78 (6th Cir. 1989); Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W. 2d 466, 451
(1990). Bose and Harte-Hanks require greater deference, because under New York
Times, when reviewing evidence of actual malice, appellate courts are not required to
defer to any of the jury's factual findings. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285.
Bose involved a product disparagement action brought by a stereo-speaker manufacturer against Consumer Reports after the magazine reported that "individual
instruments heard through the Bose system seemed to grow to gigantic proportions
and tended to wander about the room.- Bose, 466 U.S. at 488. At trial, Arnold
Seligson, who prepared reports for the article, testified that he had intended to
describe movement "back and forth along the wall between the speakers" rather
than "about the room.· [d. at 495-96. Rejecting Seligson's testimony as incredible, the
district court concluded the article was published with actual malice and judgment
was entered in favor of the plaintiff. [d. at 497. On appeal, the Supreme Court framed
the issue as whether, accepting the district court's credibility determination, clear and
convincing evidence of actual malice was present. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 689
n.35. Ultimately, the Court concluded the evidence was constitutionally deficient. Bose,
466 U.S. at 513. The Court reasoned that "the difference between hearing violin
sounds move around the room and hearing them wander back and forth [fit] easily within the breathing space that gives life to the First Amendment." [d.
Similarly, in Harte-Hanks, the Supreme Court deferred to the jury's determination
that the defendant publisher's testimony was not credible. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at
692. There, a mayoral candidate sued the Daily Journal after the newspaper charged
him with bribing a grand jury witness. [d. at 660. Apparently there was evidence,
known to the story's editors, suggesting that the Journal's source of information for
the story was not trustworthy. [d. at 692-93. When asked to explain the failure to pursue this evidence, one editor testified that he believed this evidence had not been significant. [d. at 683-84 n.32. The jury rejected the editor's testimony as incredible, and
delivered a verdict for the plaintiff. [d. at 661. Adhering to its decision in Bose, the
Court concluded the jury's assessment of the publisher's credibility at trial was properly reviewed for clear error. [d. at 688. And, remarking that the evidence was
"unmistakably sufficient to support a finding of actual malice,- the Court affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. [d. at 693. The Court reasoned that, "[a]ccepting
the jury's determination that [the defendant'sl explanations for these omissions
[was] not credible, it [was] likely that the newspaper's inaction was the product of a
deliberate decision not to acquire knowledge of the facts that might confirm the
probable falsity of [the] charges.- [d. at 692.
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erroneous standard." This mandate, labeled the "credibility exception" by the Ninth Circuit,86 is justified on grounds
that appellate courts, with only bare records before them, are
in "no position to consider the credibility of witnesses and
must leave questions of demeanor to the trier of fact. "S7

C.

DEFAMACAST

Courts are not in complete agreement as to whether
defamation by radio and television is a new tort or whether it
is properly classified as libel or slander.sa While many courts
treat defamation by radio and television as either libel or
slander,s9 some courts in fact treat it as a new tort, frequently called "defamacast. "70 Regardless of how the tort is classified,
plaintiffs are still subject to constitutional restraints in cases
governed by New York Times.71
IV.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Ninth Circuit's principal task was determining whether
the district court's finding that NBC broadcasted the October
65. Bose, 466 U.S. at 500; Harle-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688; see also Newton, 930 F.2d
at 670-71; Newsom, 888 F.2d at 377-78; Diesen, 455 N.W. 2d at 451.
66. Newton, 930 F.2d at 671 ("we read Bose and Harte-Hanks as creating a
'credibility eJCception' to the rule ofindependent review") (emphasis added).
67. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 692 F.2d 189, 195 (1st Cir.
1982); Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688; Newsom, 888 F.2d at 377-78. "The reason for
using the clearly erroneous standard is that the trial judge is thought to have an advantage over the appellate court because of his opportunity to view the witnesses;
demeanor evidence is of course unavailable to the appellate court." Friedenthal,
supra note 57, at 601; see also Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854
(1982) (clearly erroneous standard "rests upon the unique opportunity of the trial court
judge to evaluate the credibility of witnesses").
68. See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Defamation by Radio or Television, 50 A.L.R.
3d 1311, 1319 (1990).
69. Apparently where a written script is used, most courts treat defamation by
radio and television as libel. See generally Martins v. Coelho 478 N.Y.2d 58 (1984);
National Ass'n of Government Employees, Inc. v. Central Broadcasting Corp., 379 Mass
220 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935; First Independent Baptist Church v.
Southerland, 373 So.2d 647 (1979); Gray v. WALA-TV, 384 So.2d 1062 (1980); Charles
Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605 (1955); see also Shor v. Billingsley,
158 N.Y.2d 476 (1956) (statement made on television not from written script treated
as libel). In contrast, California courts classify defamation by radio and television as
slander. See, e.g., White v. Valenta, 234 Cal. App. 2d 243 (1965); Amo v. Stewart, 245
Cal. App. 2d 955 (1966).
70. See, e.g., American Broadcasting-Paramount Theaters, Inc. v. Simpson, 106
Ga. App. 230 (1962); Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co. 336 Pa. 182 (1939);
Purcell v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 411 Pa. 167 (1963).
71. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 31, at 812; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 581(2) cmt. g.
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6 story with actual malice was supported by constitutionally
sufficient evidence. 72
A.

REJECTING THE DISTRICT COURT'S HOLDING

The district court's ruling was based on two findings. 73
First, the district court found that NBC's conduct, whether or
not intentional, constituted reckless disregard for the truth.7.
The court reasoned that NBC should have foreseen that the
October 6 broadcast would create a defamatory impression
that the Mafia helped Newton purchase the Aladdin. 76 Second,
the district court ruled that because the defamatory impressions created by the October 6 broadcast were "clear and
inescapable, the jury could reject as incredible the journalists'
testimony"76 that the broadcast was "not intended to leave a
false impression. "77
The Ninth Circuit rejected both findings. 78 Emphasizing
that actual malice is a subjective inquiry,19 the court rejected
the district court's first contention that NBC should have foreseen the defamatory impression created by the October 6
broadcast. 8o The court reasoned that the district court had
erroneously employed an objective standard. 81
The Ninth Circuit also dismissed the district court's second
contention. 82 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the jury's negative assessment of the testimony of the NBC journalists at trial
alone could not support the verdict. 83 The Ninth Circuit
72. Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 930 F.2d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 1991)
("[t]he issue ofactual malice disposes of this appeal").
73. Id. at 680.
74. Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1066, 1068 (1987).
75.Id.
76. Id. at 1067.
77. Id. at 1067-68.
78. See infra notes 79-85.
79. Newton, 930 F.2d at 680.
80.Id.
81. Id. Emphasizing that the New York Times actual malice test is deliberately subjective, the Ninth Circuit explained that the "objective negligence test" employed
by the district court constituted reversible error, because "[n]egligence can never give
rise to liability in a public figure defamation case." Id.
82.Id.
83. Id. The Ninth Circuit explained that M[w ]hen the testimony of a witness is not
believed, the trier offact may simply disregard it. Normally the discredited testimony is not consider,d a sufficient basis for drawing a contrary conclusion." Id. (citing
Bose, 466 U.S. at 512).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss1/18

12

Fliegel: Torts

1992]

TORTS

247

reasoned further that the district court had erroneously ruled
that the jury could infer from the nature of the broadcast that
NBC intended to defame Newton." The court explained that by
shifting the focus of the actual malice inquiry from the state
of mind of the NBC journalists to the impressions allegedly created by the broadcast, the district court's ruling was inconsistent with the mandate of New York Times. 86

B.

PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES

Before addressing the arguments advanced on appeal, the
court addressed two issues: Identifying the appropriate standard to review the jury's findings of actual malice,s6 and discerning whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) imposed
restrictions on the court's ability to review the jury's credibility determinations. 8 ?

1.

The Standard of Review

In attempting to identify the appropriate standard of
review, the Ninth Circuit focused on the Supreme Court's decisions in New York Times, Bose and Harte-Hanks. 88 The court
84. [d.
85. [d. The court's analysis here was premised on the idea that the requisite intent
could not be inferred from the nature of the broadcast, or, more specifically, from the
jury's interpretation of the "supposed impressions left by the broadcast.... " [d. at 681.
The court reasoned that to "permit liability to be imposed not only for what was not
said but also for what was not intended to be said" would eviscerate the first amendment protections recognized by the Supreme Court in New York Times. [d. (emphasis added).
With respect to this issue, a compelling argument was presented in an appellate
brief filed by amici curiae, submitted in support of NBC's appeal by ABC, CBS and Fox
Television. The brieffocused on the issue of whether liability could be imposed based
on false impressions viewers may have drawn from a news broadcast. Brief for Amici
Curiae at 2, Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 930 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1991)
(88-05848). Emphasizing that "[a]n impression, by definition, is something not said
by the journalist, but that may be taken away by the viewer; amici argued that the
first amendment prohibited liability based solely on impressions in public figure
cases. [d. at 9-15. Amici stressed that were liability permitted in this manner, the media
would be "unduly burdened." [d. at 14. As an alternative argument, amici argued that
recovery should only be permitted where the plaintiff presents clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant intended to leave the allegedly defamatory impression.
[d. at 15-21. The Ninth Circuit apparently adopted the later argument. See Newton,
930 F.2d at 681.
86. [d. at 669.
87. Id. at 671.
88. See id. at 669. The Ninth Circuit stated that "[a]s we consider the direction
in which we should proceed, our compass is the Supreme Court's decisions in New York
Times, Bose and Harte-Hanks." [d.
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interpreted New York Times as mandating an "independent
examination of the whole record."89 The court explained, however, that when specifically reviewing credibility
determinations, Bose and Harte-Hanks require a narrower
standard. 90 The court thus concluded that under the doctrine
of independent review, with the exception of credibility determinations, all evidence of actual malice is reviewed de novo in
actions arising under the First Amendment. 9!

2.

Rule 52(a)

The Ninth Circuit recognized that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 52(a) requires deference to the trial court's factual findings. 92 The court also recognized that when reviewing
findings of fact turning on the jury's assessment of a speaker's
credibility at trial, the Rule's presumption of correctness is
stronger than in other cases. 93 Nonetheless, the court concluded that even when paying special deference to credibility
determinations, appellate courts must examine the factual
record "in full. "94 The court reasoned this review was necessary
to protect the fundamental first amendment values at issue. 96
Through this analysis, the court concluded Rule 52(a) did not
restrict the scope of its independent review. 96
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 670-71.

91. Id. at 671.
92. Id. at 670. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides that "[fJindings of

fact ... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of witnesses." FED. R.
Crv. P. 52(a).
93. Id. The court also observed that the presumption of correctness carries "less
force when a factfinder's findings rely on its weighing of evidence and drawing of inferences." Id. at 671.
94. Id. (quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285 (citing Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946))).
95. Id. at 672.
96. Id. at 687. The Ninth Circuit's analysis here paralleled the Supreme Court's
analysis in Bose, where the Court also sought to determine whether Rule 52(a)
restricted its ability to review credibility determinations. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 498501. In Bose, the Court held that Rule 52(a) did not limit its ability to exercise independent appellate review. Id. at 514. The Court reasoned that Rule 52(a) did not
prescribe the standard of review for "mixed finding oflaw and fact," and thus arguably
characterized the actual malice inquiry as a mixed law-fact question. See id. at 501.
The Ninth Circuit did not expressly adopt the Bose Court's characterization. The
court, however, appears to have ruled that it was not bound by Rule 52(a). See
Newton, 930 F.2d at 671-72. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that the court
implicitly treated the actual malice determination in a fashion similar to the Bose
decision, as a mixed law-fact finding. Language in the opinion supports this conclusion.
In a footnote, the court observed that actual malice involves a state of mind inquiry
"normally subjected to review under the 'clearly erroneous' standard." Id. at 670
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INDEPENDENT REVIEW By THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Newton argued that an inference of actual malice was
raised by NBC's failure to mention (during the October 6
broadcast) that Penosi had been contacted for help resolving
problems Newton was having with the Genovese family.97
Emphasizing the journalists knew Newton contacted Penosi
concerning the threats,98 Newton argued that although they testified the threats were not mentioned because information
concerning their origin was rejected as incredible," the jury
"must have concluded that the journalists were lying."loo
Newton argued further that the journalists' incredible testimony supplied an inference of actual malice. lol
The Ninth Circuit rejected Newton's argument. 102 The court
reasoned that NBC's failure to mention the threats was irrelevant,103 and that mentioning the threats would not have
diminished the broadcast's defamatory impact. 104 The court
also concluded that even if inclusion of the threats would have
diminished the broadcast's defamatory impact, the evidence
would still have been constitutionally deficient. lOS The court concluded thus that Ross and Silverman's decision not to rely on
Moreno's explanation for Newton's contacting Penosi did not
n.12. Yet evidence of actual malice was reviewed de novo. Id. at 679-83. Hence,
because the court declined application oCthe clearly erroneous standard, arguably it
characterized the evidence as something more than a "pure question of fact," most likely as a mixed law-fact question.
97.Id.
98. Id. at 682. During an interview with Mark Moreno, Newton's close friend and
business associate, the journalists who prepared the story for NBC (Ross and
Silverman) learned that Newton possibly contacted Penosi concerning the problems
he was having with the Genovese famny.ld. at 678. Newton claimed the interview with
Moreno clearly explained why he had consulted Penosi. Id. at 682.
99.Id.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 681.
102. Id. at 681-82.
103. Id.
104. Id. The court concluded that even if the threats had been mentioned:
[a]l1 the essential ingredients of the broadcast would have
remained; the ongoing federal investigation; the fact that
Newton had had financial difficulties; the fact that he had
sought and obtained the assistance of organized crime; the
fact that that assistance had included high level criminal figures helping Newton out; and the fact that those figures
then spoke with each other about 'earning' off Newton after
he was licensed to run the Aladdin.ld.
105. Id.
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constitute clear and convincing evidence of actual malice, as
required by New York Times. l "
Newton also advanced several other arguments in support of the jury's verdict. lo7 Rejecting each of these arguments
as well,l08 the court concluded insufficient evidence of actual
106. Id. The court observed that Newton's argument was predicated on the
assumption that Ross and Silverman should have accepted Moreno's explanation of
why Newton contacted Penosi.ld. (emphasis added). The court expressly rejected this
assumption. Id. The court reasoned that Ross and Silverman had valid reasons for
rejecting Moreno's testimony, being that the journalists knew Moreno had connections
with the Mafia, and because while Moreno claimed to be Newton's business manager, Newton had testified to the Nevada Gaming Board that he and Moreno had "no association whatsoever." Id. at 683-84. The court also noted that Newton's attorney had
"flatly denied" Penosi was contacted regarding the threats. Id.
107. Id. at 684-87. Newton advanced the following arguments:
(1) That to defame Newton, NBC included a reference in the
October 6 broadcast to Newton's financial problems in
order to bolster the idea that he sought to obtain assistance from the Mafia. Id. at 684.
(2) That removal of the word "serious" from an early draft of
the broadcast reflected NBC's desire to exaggerate
Newton's financial difficulties again in order to suggest
he contacted Mafia figures for money to help buy the
Aladdin. Id. at 685.
(3) That because Ross and Silverman learned at the Gaming
Board hearing that the Valley Bank was going to help
finance Newton's purchase of the Aladdin, Ross and
Silverman knew no hidden partner was involved, and
thus falsely stated that the Mafia had a hidden interest
in the Aladdin. Id.
(4) That the broadcast was misleading as the result oflanguage choices and editing decisions made by NBC.ld. at
685-86.
(5) That the failure of Ross and Silverman to interview
Newton provided evidence the journalists consciously
avoided hearing Newton's account of events.ld. at 686.
(6) And, finally, that the broadcasts ·overall impression," if
not the individual statements, was defamatory. Id. at
687.
108. Newton's additional arguments were rejected for the following reasons:
(1) References in the October 6 broadcast to Newton's financial difficulties were true, and thus incapable of furnishing evidence of actual malice. Id. at 684.
(2) Removal of the word "serious" was insignificant because
of its low probative value.ld. at 685.
(3) Testimony at the Gaming Board hearing did not exclude
the possibility of a hidden partner because the Bank's
involvement and a Mafia influence were not mutually
exclusive. Id.
(4) Language choices and editing decisions could not subject
NBC to liability because the editorial process is protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 685-86.
(5) Newton could not claim NBC "did not try hard enough to
interview him" when initially in fact he refused to be
interviewed. Id. at 686.
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malice existed to support the jury's verdict. 109 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit reversed. 110

v.

CRITIQUE

Newton's case raised the troubling issue of whether juries
should be trusted to safeguard free speech.111 Confronting this
issue directly, the Ninth Circuit signaled its response by expressly limiting the range of issues immunized from appellate scrutiny, and, in turn, effectively narrowing the jury's role in public
figure defamation actions. ll2 This was a sound measure.
Impartial juries may be threatening the continued viability of
first amendment due process. 113 Consequently, the remedial
function served by first amendment independent appellate
review - moderating the jury's impact on free speech - is becoming increasingly important. 114 The Ninth Circuit's decision is
commendable because Newton is responsive to this need. 116
(6) And, lastly, the overall impression communicated by
the broadcast was irrelevant because the court evaluates
the broadcasts, not from the perspective of an ordinary
viewer, but as a set of facts having constitutional significance.ld. at 687.
109. ld.
110. ld.
111. See generally Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 930 F.2d 652
(1991). As observed by Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion, this was also the
real issue presented in New York Times. 376 U.S. at 300 (Goldberg and Douglas, J.J.,
concurring). The issue is "troubling" because, while jury trials permit the community to be represented in the adjudicative process, their presence potentially threatens
free speech as well. See infra notes 139-151 and accompanying text discussing media
self-censorship.
The trial of John Peter Zenger is perhaps one of the earliest cases raising the issue
of precisely what role juries should play in protecting free speech. The trial is reported as the Trial of John Peter Zenger, 17 Howell's St. Trials 675 (1816); see also J.
ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER,
PRINTED OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL (S. Katz ed. 1963). Zenger, a publisher and
political dissenter, was prosecuted for the common law crime of seditious libel after
he published an article criticizing Governor William Crosby's regime of the Province
of New York. Though the jury was obligated under the law to convict Zenger, as the
only issues before the jury were whether Zenger published the article and whether it
referred to the allegedly libelous subject, neither of which were contested by Zenger,
he was acquitted. Because the jury exceeded its legal authority, in effect resolving the
issue of whether the article was libelous (treated at the time of the trial as a question
for the judge), the case raised an important question: Whether the jury was sufficiently
competent to be entrusted with the responsibility to protect free speech. See generally
Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CAL. L. REV.
761 (1986).
112. Newton, 930 F.2d at 683.
113. See infra notes 139-151 and accompanying text.
114. See id.
115. See Newton, 930 F.2d at 683. Newton is responsive to the increasing need
for remedial appellate review because. by narrowing the range of issues immunized
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A second issue raised in Newton is the question of at
what cost society is willing to protect the plaintiff's interest
in reputation.tlB This issue was raised because, while plaintiffs tend to prevail before a jury,1I7 their rate of success on
appeal is extremely low, tlB and by expanding the scope of
first amendment independent appellate review, the Ninth
Circuit fixed heightened scrutiny as an additional obstacle to
recovery.119 This aspect of the decision is also laudable.
Plaintiffs have a legitimate interest in maintaining their
reputation. 120 But, where conflicting with society's interest in
from de novo review, Newton removes restrictions on first amendment independent
appellate review, and thus better enables appellate courts to temper the impact
potentially impartial juries have on first amendment freedoms. See id.
116. In Newton, the Ninth Circuit was challenged to balance the individual's interest in reputation against society's larger interest in deterring media self-censorship.
See generally id., at 682-83. Proceeding on the assumption that these interests have
an inversely proportional relationship, the issue might be stated more precisely as
whether society is willing to protect the plaintiff's interest in reputation at the
expense of the gradual depletion of first amendment freedoms.
117. Matheson, supra note 56 at 281, n.379 (arguing empirical evidence "confirms
the perception that juries cannot be expected to be sufficiently sensitive to first
amendment freedoms"). Professor Matheson emphasizes the following findings: The
Iowa Libel Research Project determined that in media libel cases between 1974 and
1984 defendants prevailed at trial in only 1 of 13 cases brought before a jury; the Libel
Defense Resource Center found that in cases brought prior to 1982 plaintiffs prevailed
at trial in approximately 89% (42/47) of cases submitted to a jury and that between
1982 and 1984 their rate of success was 62% (33/53); and, that according to Professor
Marc Franklin between 1977 and 1980 plaintiffs were victorious at trial in 83%
(20/24) of the actions heard by juries. [d.
Professor Franklin has attempted to explain why juries frequently find in favor
of the plaintiff. See Marc. A. Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of
Libel Law and a Proposal, 18 U .S.F. L. REV. I, 5 (1983). He suggests the phenomenon
may be explained by the following factors: (i) "sympathy for a plaintiff who is perceived
to have suffered harm"; (ii) confusion over "the complexity of the judges' instructions
in libel law"; and, (iii) "animosity towards the press." [d. at 7-8.
118. PI ave, supra note 50, at 854 n.1 (federal appellate courts have reversed
"approximately 70% of the libel judgments won by plaintiffs involving rulings on actual malice"); Franklin, supra note 117, at 5 ("[iJn all, plaintiffs who sue media defendants ultimately get and keep judgments in five to ten percent of all libel cases ... ");
Matheson, supra note 56, at 280 ("using independent appellate review, appellate
courts have reversed approximately eighty percent of the jury verdicts entered
against publishers").
119. See Newton, 930 F.2d at 683.
120. In his concurring opinion in Rosenblatt, Justice Stewart remarked that the
right of individuals to protect their good name "reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being - a concept at the root
of any decent system of ordered liberty." Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Harlan, writing for himself and three other Justices,
has commented that society has a "pervasive and strong interest in preventing and
redressing attacks upon reputation." Butts, 388 U.S. at 147; see also Janklow v.
Newsweek, 788 F.2d 1300, 1308 (8th Cir. 1986) (Bowman, Ross and Fagg, J.J., dissenting) ("the right to obtain legal redress for injury to one's ... reputation" is precious); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341; Robertson, supra note 56, at 204-12; Keeton, supra note
36, at 1221-22; Prosser & Keeton, supra note 31, at 771.
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promoting the free flow of ideas, the individual's interest in
reputation must yield. tal Free speech and press are cornerstones of our constitutional system,122 and where the "security
of the Republic"123 is concerned, "the needs of the many outweigh
the needs of the few. "124
Concern for free speech clearly influenced the Ninth
Circuit's analysis. 126 In fact, interpreting the court's holding as
a policy statement to the effect that competing interests must
yield to free speech would not be entirely unreasonable.
Recognizing this, a more detailed consideration of these issues
becomes necessary here.
A.

FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

The credibility exception limits the range of issues subject
to de novo appellate review. 126 Consequently, by immunizing
credibility determinations from heightened appellate scrutiny,
the credibility exception inhibits the remedial function of
appellate review. Recently compiled empirical evidence strongly suggests this may not be wise. Particularly compelling is evidence revealing that juries frequently find for plaintiffs in
media libel actions l27 and that the fear of litigation is encouraging media self-censorship.128
By drawing on its remedial authority, the Ninth Circuit tailored its holding to address precisely this concern. 129
121. See infra notes 159-177 and accompanying text arguing that society's interest in promoting the free flow of ideas is paramount to society's interest in protecting
the individual's interest in maintaining reputation.
122. See generally New York Times, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). There, the Supreme
Court declared that *[t]he maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion
to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people ... is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.· [d. at 269 (quoting Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931». Similarly, in Bose, the Court stated that *[t]he freedom to speak one's mind is not only an aspect ofliberty - and thus a good unto itself, but
also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole."
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 85 U.S. 46,49 (1988) (quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 503-04».
123. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269.
124. CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITIES, at 364 (Signet ed. 1960). When considering the fact that plaintiffs appear to be using courts to vindicate themselves rather
than to obtain redress, this phrase would seem to take on additional significance. See
infra notes 163-66.
125. See Newton, 930 F.2d at 682-83.
126. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 117.
128. See infra notes 139-152 discussing defamation litigation and the media.
129. See Newton, 930 F.2d at 683.
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Understanding this aspect of the court's decision thus requires
an appreciation for the remedial function of appellate review.
Additionally, because the Newton decision represents a
response to jury hostility towards the media,180 this development must also be considered.
1.

The Remedial Function of Appellate Review

The fact finding process is not infallible. 181 Recognizing
this; the legal system has charged appellate courts with the
task to expose and remedy the system's proceduralshortcomings. 182 This is accomplished by authorizing appellate courts to
discard the factfinder's findings in favor of their own,183 to
render judgment with limited deference to the disposition
130. See id. In attempting to explain why juries are hostile towards the media,
Professor Franklin suggests that this a.nimosity may be the product of a common perception that journalists are "arrogant" and that the press "appears to be reluctant to
admit its errors." Franklin, supra note 117, at 8-9. Notably, plaintiffs are also perceived
as hostile towards the media. See Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect:
What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs Get, 74 CAL. L. REV. 789, 791-92 (1986).
Professor Bezanson suggests this may result from poor relations between plaintiffs
and media defendants.ld. In support of this supposition, he emphasizes the fact that
while plaintiffs frequently "contact the media before contacting a lawyer," the media's
response is reported as being "offensive," typically characterized by plaintiffs as "arrogant, indifferent or insensitive." ld. at 792.
131. Friedenthal, supra note 57, at 598 ("[w]e recognize that trials will not be error
free"); Matheson, supra note 56, at 239-40 (the fact- finding process cannot "guarantee accurate results").
132. See Matheson, supra note 56, at 273. Appellate courts are empowered to remedy flaws exposed during the reviewing process by substituting their findings in
favor ofthe factfinder's. Friedenthal, supra note 57, at 601. Appellate courts, however,
do not have license to arbitrarily discard trial court findings. Questions of law are
reviewed with minimum deference. Swint, 456 U.S. at 287 (district court's legal
determinations are not reviewed for clear error). Questions oflaw involve general legal
"principles, rules and standards governing particular conflicts. Henry P. Monaghan,
Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 253 (1985). Questions of fact, on
the other hand, are not freely reviewable. Friedenthal, supra note 57, at 601. "Case
specific inquiries about who, when, what and where" can be characterized as questions
offact.ld. Factual findings are generally not disturbed unless clearly erroneous. See
FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a); Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 394-95.
Mixed questions oflaw and fact, like pure questions oflaw, also appear to be subject to de novo review. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 517; Friedenthal, supra note 57, at 602;
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2589,
at 753 (1971). In Bose, the Supreme Court explained that mixed fact-law findings "cross
the line from ordinary principles oflogic and common experience ordinarily entrusted to the finder of fact into the real of a legal rule" requiring independent review. Bose,
466 U.S. at 517 n. 17. Arguably, in Bose, actual malice was treated as a mixed lawfact question. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 517 (Rehnquist and O'Connor, J.J., dissenting);
but see Bezanson, supra note 38, at ll8 (arguing the Court was not prepared to characterize actual malice as a mixed law-fact question).
133. See supra note 132.
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arrived at in the trial court,IM and to review particular categories of evidence independently. 136
Some circumstances warrant greater appellate scrutiny.13B
Where required, the remedial powers of appellate courts are
expanded. 137 Heightened scrutiny thus represents a powerful
mechanism for moderating the factfinder's impact on the judicial process. l36 As demonstrated below, within the context of
public defamation law, this remedial, or "corrective," function
is becoming increasingly important.

2.

A Sensitive Reaction: Defamation Litigation and the Media

Contemporary first amendment theory has witnessed a
marked shift in attitudes towards juries. 139 When the First
Amendment was adopted, juries were widely regarded as the
"primary protector of free speech. "140 Today, however, some
134. As a practical matter, however, appellate courts only reverse lower courts
where "convinced the court below was clearly wrong." Friedenthal, supra note 57, at
605.
135. See .Bose, 466 U.S. at 518 (Rehnquist and O'Connor, J.J .• dissenting).
"Presumably any doctrine of ' independent review' exists ... so that the perceived shortcomings of the trier of fact by way of bias or some other factor may be compensated
for." [d.
136. The exercise of heightened review is justified on grounds that a more discriminating deference is required in cases implicating constitutional freedoms. See,
e.g., Newton, 930 F.2d at 670 ("rule of independent review assigns judges a constitutional duty that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact"). At least this appears to be
the case where first amendment values are implicated, and the Supreme Court's
decision in Bose has been expressly criticized for failing to explain why heightened
appellate review is required where free speech is involved but not where other areas
of constitutional law are concerned. See Monaghan, supra note 132, at 264; Bezanson,
supra note 38, at 114.
137. The remedial powers of appellate courts are expanded because heightened
scrutiny requires only minimal deference to findings by the trier of fact. See generally
New York Times, 276 U.S. 254 (1964); Bose, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
138. Clearly the Supreme Court contemplated this notion in New York Times,
independent appellate review mandated specifically to temper the impact of prejudice
. in favor of Sullivan, a prominent local figure. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285;
see also Newton, 930 F .2d at 6.71. Directed verdicts and judgments notwithstanding
the verdict (JNOV) also represent mechanisms for controlling juries. See generally
Friedenthal, supra note 57, at 540.
139. Schauer, supra note 111, at 765. One commentator observes that the jury's
role in the judicial process has shifted as well. Martin A. Kotler, Reappraising the Jury's
Role as Finder of Fact, 20 GA. L. REV. 123, 127 (1985). Professor Kotler suggests that
gradually the jury's role has shifted from the "eighteenth century conception of the
jury's function as that of finder of law" to the "modern notion that the jury is essentially a finder offact." [d.
140. Schauer. supra note 111. at 765; Henry P. Monaghan. First Amendment "Due
Process", 83lIARv. L. REV. 518. 528 (1970) (juries have "long been extolled as a great
guarantor of individual freedom, including freedom of speech").

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992

21

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 18

256

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:235

scholars argue free speech may need to be protected from
juries. 141 Primarily, these scholars argue that juries are not sufficiently sensitive to first amendment freedoms,t42 and emphasize that juries are incapable of grasping the subtleties of the
actual malice standard. l43 This shift in attitude is the product
of developments since 1964, evidence compiled in the wake of
the Supreme Court's landmark decision in New York Times
strongly suggesting concern for whether juries are competent
to protect free speech may be warranted. I" The media has not
been indifferent to these developments. In fact, media behavior appears to have been distinctly influenced, and, while documenting instances of media self-censorship is difficult,145 the
consensus is that "a chill has indeed set in. "146

•

141. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 300 (Goldberg and Douglas, J.J., concurring)
(arguing that juries cannot effectively safeguard free speech and for an absolute
rather than qualified privilege); OIlman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1006 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985) ("juries do not give adequate attention to limits imposed by the First Amendment"); Monaghan, supra note
140, at 529 (arguing juries should playa limited rather than expansive role in first
amendment cases); Schauer, supra note 111, at 765 ("where 250 years ago, more jury
power was taken as coincident with greater freedom of speech, more jury power now
is taken as just the opposite"); Levine, supra note 3, at 28 (reporting juries are not adequately protecting free speech).
142. See supra note 141.
143. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 300 (Goldberg and Douglas, J.J., concurring)
("there can be little doubt that public debate and advocacy will be restrained" if the
issue of liability for "false and maliciously motivated statements" is left to the jury);
see also Keeton, supra note 36, at 1224 ("notion that a jury can make practical use of
theoretical distinctions is simply a fallacy"). Specifically with respect to how skilled
juries are in handling the concept of actual malice, a recent statement made by a juror
following the delivery of the original verdict in Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762 (D.C.
Cir 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987), is illustrative. When asked by
a reporter why the jury found for Tavoulareas, one juror responded that while the jury
did not believe the Post published the allegedly defamatory article with actual malice, they did believe the Post failed to prove the article was true. Plave, supra note 50,
at 878 (quoting Brill, Inside the Jury Room at the Washington Post Libel Trial, AM.
LAw., Nov. 1982, at 1); see also Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 95 (Black, J., concurring and
dissenting) (actual malice affords the press "little protection against high emotions
and deep prejudices which frequently pervade local communities"); but cf. Bose, 466
U.S. at 515 (Rehnquist and O'Connor, J.J., dissenting) (actual malice determination
"involve[s] no more than findings about the mens rea of an author, findings which
appellate courts are ill-prepared to make"); Matheson, supra note 56, at 274 (emphasizing that judges may be no better than juries at protecting free speech, because "like
jur[ies], [they are] free to use suppression of speech as a policy tool").
144. See supra note 117,
145. Levine, supra note 3, at 29 n. 125; David A. Anderson, Libel and Press SelfCensorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422, 430 (1975); Franklin, supra note 117, at 15 .
146. Levine, supra note 3, at 29 n. 125 (quoting Massing, The Libel Chill: How
Cold Is It Out There?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. May/June 1985 at 31); see also David
A. Anderson, A Response to Professor Robertson: The Issue is Control of Press Power,
54 TEX. L. REV. 271, 283 (1976) ("I have no doubt that [the threat of self-censorship]
is real and serious"); but see David W. Robertson, supra note 56, at 260-61 (express-
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One explanation for this phenomenon may be that the
media is having a sensitive reaction to developments in the
legal community. Considering the nature of the editorial and
investigative processes, this result is not surprising. As
observed by the Ninth Circuit:
•

Newspapers and other media regularly
digest a veritable avalanche of facts; these
facts must be gathered from diverse sources,
not all of equal reliability; judgments as to
accuracy must often be made on the basis of
incomplete information and under the pressure ofa deadline. Newspapers might never
be published if they were required to guarantee the accuracy of every reported fact;
time and manpower do not permit the type
of verification that would prevent all mistakes. 147

Similarly, the Eight Circuit has cautioned that:
Courts must be slow to intrude into the area
of editorial judgment, not only with respect
to choices of words, but also with respect to
inclusions in or omissions from news stories. Accounts of past events are always
selective, and under the First Amendment
the decision of what to select must always be
left to writers and editors. It is not the business of government. 148
Yet as lower courts have struggled to apply the actual malice
test, standards of journalistic conduct have increasingly become
subject to judicial scrutiny.149 Paralleled by a significant
ing skepticism concerning whether threats of self-censorship actually exist); Gertz, 418
U.S. at 390 (rejecting proposition that the threat of private litigation causes the
press to refrain from publishing).
147. Newton., 930 F.2d at 683 (citing Masson v. New York Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d
1535, 1557 (9th Cir. 1989».
148. Jan.klow, 788 F.2d at 1306.
149. Levine, supra note 3, at 24. Notably, some commentators argue in favor of
media regulation. For example, Professor Robertson argues that "[e]nough evidence of
media irresponsibility and abuse of power exists to disparage full reliance on the
media's willingness to police itself." Robertson, supra note 56, at 208. He emphasizes
that "[e]nsuring a free and dynamic press is one thing; permitting the press to be a law
unto itself is another." [d. Professor Martin Shapiro suggests that among the factors
supporting arguments for more law regulating the media are "concentration," the
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increase in the number of defamation actions instituted against
the media,160 developments in the legal community have conspired to create a legal environment which may be hostile to
free speech. 161 This was the background against which Newton
was decided, and undoubtedly of which the Ninth Circuit was
acutely aware. 162
3.

Sound Measures by the Ninth Circuit

•

As demonstrated in New York Times, the remedial authority of appellate courts can be harnessed to achieve socially
desirable results. 163 In Newton, the Ninth Circuit expressly
recognized this proposition. 164 More importantly, by taking
measures to narrow the scope of the credibility exception, the
result of the diminished number of major newspapers and television networks being
a proportional increase in the survivors' power, the "geographic scope" of the media,
and, with respect to television, the special characteristic of "dramatic nuance: television journalists having enormous "power of insinuation." Martin M. Shapiro, Libel
Regulatory Analysis, 74 CAL. L. REV. 883, 883-84 (1986). In contrast, some scholars
challenge the viability of this position, Professor Anderson arguing, for example,
that "libel law is [not] an appropriate solution to the problem ... too clumsy, too discriminatory, too uncertain." Anderson, supra note 146, at 283.
150. Levine, supra note 3, at 24. Professor Levine reports that "[o]ne major
liable insurance carrier has estimated a 10% to 25% increase in the number of
defamation actions in the past few years alone." [d. at 24 n.100.
151. See generally id. at 24-32. In addition to an increase in the number of libel
action instituted against the media, the size of damage awards and cost of defending
defamation litigation have also spiraled. [d. at 25 n.102: Franklin, supra note 117, at
10-11 (suggesting escalating damage awards may result from the fact that "when summary judgment procedures are rigorously administered only the most egregious
cases reach the jury" and also from the lack of "guidelines for determining damages"); but see Bezanson, supra note 130, at 791 ("By most standards, plaintiffs'
financial victories were of modest proportion.") (emphasis added). In turn, escalating
defense costs have resulted in higher insurance premiums, and increased litigation
fees have produced reluctance of even the insured media to engage in certain types
of journalism. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1971) (threat of engaging in
litigation results in self-censorship): Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 205 (1979)
(Marshal, J., dissenting) (expense of vindication may be more important to publishers than risk of liability). Undoubtedly this exercise in self-restrain can accurately be
characterized as having a ·chilling effect" on free speech, precisely the result sought
to be avoided by the Supreme Court in New York Times. See generally New York Times,
376 U.S. 254. For a comprehensive discussion of the chilling effect, see Note, The
Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808 (1969).
152. See generally Newton, 930 F.2d 683.
153. See generally New York Times, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
154. Newton, 930 F.2d at 670. The Ninth Circuit observed that "[t]he requirement
of independent appellate review established in New York Times is a rule of federal constitutionallaw which 'reflects' a deeply held conviction that judges ... must exercise
such review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the
Constitution." [d. (citations omitted).
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court implemented it. 166 In light of the foregoing discussion, it
would seem that these measures were particularly warranted.
But heightened review was also seemingly compelled by the
specific facts of Newton's case;l68 Newton is a "local hero,"167and
both the Ninth Circuit and the district court were appreciative
of the fact that venue was an issue of constitutional significance. 168 Taken together, these two factors support a determination that the Ninth Circuit employed sound measures in
resolving the issue of whether NBC broadcast the October
6th report with actual malice.
B.

Footing the Bill for Recovery

On appeal, approximately one of ten plaintiffs stands to
prevail in defamation actions instituted against the media. 169 This
fact has led one commentator to suggest that this may be the
most "dismal performance by plaintiffs in any area of tort law."I60
Support for this conclusion may also be drawn from the fact that
even victorious plaintiffs are likely to be disappointed with
their awards. 181 Yet, while "most suits fail, suits persist. "162
155. See id. at 683. The Ninth Circuit employed procedural means to achieve substantive endS', e.g., heightened appellate review is employed to safeguard free speech.
[d. This notion of "procedural balancing" originated in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958), a case involving "subversive- expression where the Supreme Court concluded "the manner in which the judiciary identified protected expression is as significant
as the constitutional definition of safeguarded speech. - Levine, supra note 3, at 11.
156. Newton, 930 F.2d at 671. Serving to distinguish Newton's case from Bose and
Harte-Hanks, Newton's status as a local celebrity had additional significance. [d. The
court expressly recognized this, stating: "[O]ur case ... differs from Harte-Hanks, in
which the jury resolved a dispute between a local politician and a local newspaper, and
Bose, in which the plaintiff was an obscure corporation.- [d. The distinction is important because it highlights the fact that jury bias in favor of Newton posed a particularly acute threat to first amendment due process, and, considering the gravity of the
circumstances, it thus seems appropriate to conclude that measures taken by the court
were wise, especially when existing incentives for media self-censorship are considered as well.
157. [d. at 666.
158. [d. at 672 n.16 ("[w]e note ... that some courts have referred to the decision
as to venue of public figure defamation cases as being of 'constitutional stature'-).
Recognition of the important role venue played in Newton's case is also implicit in the
district court judge's threat that if Newton would not file the remittitur, a new trial
would be ordered in the Central District of California. [d. at 668.
159. Bezanson, supra note 130, at 790 n.4; Franklin, supra note 117, at 4-5.
160. Franklin, supra note 117, at 5.
161. Bezanson, supra note 130, at 790-91. Professor Bezanson reports that:
"Successful litigants obtained an average of $80,000 in damage awards. [d. Excluding
two large awards, however, the average recovery was only $20,600, a sizeable portion
of which went to fees and costs.Id. Plaintiffs who settled their claims obtained an average of $7,000, which also must be reduced by fees and costs.- [d. at 791.
162. [d. at 789.
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Perhaps escalating damage awards provide a simple explanation for this phenomenon. This explanation, however, is inadequate, most plaintiffs apparently bringing suit to vindicate
their reputation, not to fill their pocket-books.18s Professor
Bezanson suggests thus that "plaintiffs [may] view the lawsuit
as an instrument of self-help, regardless of its judicial outcome. "184 Considering the fact that rising libel insurance premiums and litigation fees appear to be creating incentives for
media self-censorship,186 it only seems appropriate to ask whether,
under the circumstances, the cost of permitting courts to be
used in this manner is exacting too high a price from society. 166
Historically, courts have recognized that plaintiffs have a
legitimate interest in maintaining their good reputation. 187
But courts have also recognized society's interest in promoting
the free flow of ideas. 166 This countervailing consideration has
not been neglected, the system of existing privileges gradually developed to regulate the balance between these competing
interests. 189 Notably, the balance appears to have been tipped
in favor of free speech. 170 This can be explained as a conscious
determination by society that the individual's interest in reputation must yield to society's larger interest in promoting the
free flow of ideas. In other words, society has decided (via the
courts) that, as a whole, we will not foot the bill for recovery.

Newton serves to preserve this balance by fixing heightened
appellate scrutiny as an additional obstacle to recovery in
163. [d. at 793; Anderson, supra note 145, at 435. Justice Thurgood Marshall
expressly observed this, stating that -many self· perceived victims of defamation are
animated by something more than a rational calculus of their chances of recovery."
Franklin, supra note 117, at 6 (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153,204 (1979)
(Marshall, J., dissenting».
164. Bezanson, supra note 130, at 791.
165. See supra note 151.
166. Perhaps actions brought simply as means for retribution and not for com·
pensation are accurately termed -nuisance" cases. See Franklin, supra note 117, at 5·
6.
167. See supra note 120.
168. See generally New York Times, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Bose, 466 U.S. 485 (1984);
Harte·Hanks, 491 U.S. 657 (1989); Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Pape, 401 U.S. 279
(1970); see also Keeton, supra note 36, at 1222.
169. Keeton, supra note 36, at 1222.
170. The balance has been tipped in favor of free speech, because New York Times
and its progeny have made recovery more difficult in public figure defamation cases.
See generally New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279·80; Bose, 466 U.S. at 514; Harte·Hanks,
491 U.S. at 657. Professor Robertson suggests that by 1971, -the Court plainly per·
ceived the need for 'breathing space' for [free speech and press] as much weightier than
the reputation interest at stake .... " Robertson, supra note 56, at 205.
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public figure defamation actions involving the media. 171 Simply
put, this is a sensible result. As Madison succinctly stated:
"[slome degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of
every thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that
of the press."172 Similarly, writing under their pseudonym
"Cato," John Trenchard and William Gordon proclaimed: "As
long as there are such Things as Printing and Writing, there
will be Libels. "173 But, as Cato's letters are also quick to point
out, libel "is an Evil arising out of a much greater Good. "174 This
"greater good" is free speech, and because Newton reinforces
procedural safeguards bracing the First Amendment,176 the
decision is praiseworthy. Were recovery permitted for such
abuses (abuses which both Madison l78 and the Supreme Court177
emphasize are inevitable) without adequate safeguards,
society's interest in free speech would be compromised.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Newton exempts evidence of actual malice associated with
a journalist's investigative techniques from the scope of the credibility exception.178 Consequently, Newton expands the scope of
first amendment independent appellate review. 179 Because remedial first amendment review is becoming increasingly important,
the Ninth Circuit's decision is commendable. Newton is responsive to an important need, and by narrowing the jury's role in
public figure defamation actions, should help to preserve the
continued viability of first amendment due process.
Rod M. Fliegel·
171. See Newton, 930 F.2d at 683.
172. Pape, 401 U.S. at 290 (quoting 4 J. Elliot's Debates on the Federal
Constitution 571 (1876».
173. Oakes, supra note 46, at 720 (quoting Cato, Reflections Upon Libeling (letter no. 32), in 1 CATO'S LETTERS 96, 246, 252 (Da Capo reprint ed. 1971».
174. [d. The Supreme Court has expressed this sentiment as well. In Rosenbloom,
the Court, in a plurality opinion, emphasized that: -In an ideal world, the responsibility of the press would match the freedom and the public trust given it. But from the
earliest days of our history, this free society, dependent as it is for its survival upon
a vigorous free press, has tolerated some abuse." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 51.
175. See Newton, 930 F.2d at 683.
176. See Pape, 401 U.S. at 290.
177. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72 (-erroneous statement is inevitable in
free debate") (emphasis added).
178. Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 930 F.2d 652, 683 (1991). For a
discussion of the credibility exception see supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
179. See Newton, 930 F .2d at 683.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993.
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